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The Collision of Canadian and U.S. Sovereignty in the Area of
Export Controls
Selma M. Lussenburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper provides a Canadian perspective on those areas where po-
tential conflicts may arise between business enterprises that carry
on business in Canada and in the United States. Such conflicts tend to
occur when interrelated corporate entities (i.e. subsidiary or other affili-
ate relationship) are subjected to conflicting legal requirements as a
result of the extension of sovereignty beyond national boundaries. Ex-
tra-territorial application of export control laws has tended to be based
on economic and foreign policy considerations. Those caught in the
middle tend to be business enterprises whose primary objective is the
expansion of trade or exports. These enterprises in many instances have
been unaware of the extended scope of, for example, U.S. export con-
trol laws. The question of extra-territorial application of laws may also
arise when a Canadian company, dealing at arm's length with a U.S.
company, is required to sign a contract which contains a submission
clause. Such clauses require the Canadian company to commit to ad-
hering to existing and future U.S. export control laws and orders from
U.S. export control authorities regarding the disposition of the products
beyond Canada's border. All too often the Canadian contracting party
is unfamiliar with the broad scope of U.S. export control legislation.
U.S. goods incorporated into products in Canada or the manufacture of
Canadian goods using U.S. technology destined for Cuba is the most
notorious example.
In the context of Canadian sovereignty and export controls, two
primary pieces of Canadian legislation must be considered. These are
the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA)' which provides
the Canadian government with authority to block the extra-territorial
application of foreign anti-trust law and to block foreign trading direc-
tives and orders which adversely affect Canadian interests. The second
is the Export and Import Permits Act (Export Act)2 which regulates
* Borden & Elliot, Toronto, September, 1994. This paper has been updated from the oral
presentation given at the Canada/U.S. Law Institute Conference. Part of this paper was previ-
ously published as Oye-Trade with Cuba, in Vol. XVI CANADIAN LAW NEWSLETTER OF THE
CANADIAN LAW SECTION OF THE SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (February, 1993).
1 R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1990) (Can.).
2 R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985) (Can.).
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the export of products from Canada and gives effect to Canada's inter-
national strategic commitments and foreign policy issues. While the
Export Act is a statute with which many Canadians are familiar, the
FEMA is relatively speaking less known. To date only limited action
has been taken pursuant to the FEMA; such action, however, has been
the source of controversy within the Canadian and the U.S. business
community.
This paper will provide a brief overview of the primary provisions
of the FEMA, the United States Order enacted pursuant to the
FEMA, and it will discuss the implications of this confrontation of
American and Canadian law for Canadian businesses trading with
Cuba as well as the nature of Canada's export control regime and Ca-
nada's anti-boycott policy and legislation.
II. THE CUBA PROBLEM: CLEAR CONFLICT OF SOVEREIGNTY
The enactment in October 23, 1992 of the U.S. Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 and, in particular, section 17.06(a)(1) of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1993 (Cuba Act)3 brought
to the foreground the conflict of sovereignty in the area of export con-
trols. In this context the conflict centers on the differences in Canadian
and American trading policy with respect to Cuba, and especially the
extra-territorial application of the American-Cuban embargo program.
While the United States has restricted trade with Cuba and with na-
tionals thereof and has restricted financial transactions in which Cuba
and nationals thereof have an interest since 1960, the Bush Adminis-
tration extended the scope of existing restrictions to a complete ban of
all trade with Cuba. The Clinton Administration has supported the
Bush Administration's position.
U.S. legislation now prohibits trade and financial transactions not
only between U.S. nationals and Cuba but also between U.S.-owned or
controlled firms in third countries and Cuba. The latter prohibition was
imposed by revoking the licensing mechanism set out in the Cuban As-
set Control Regulations (Cuba Regulations),4 which previously permit-
ted foreign subsidiaries of American nationals to continue to trade with
Cuba within certain defined parameters. 5 In direct contrast to the Ca-
nadian position, as a result of the Cuba Act, U.S.-owned and controlled
firms in third countries are now prohibited under American law from
exporting to and importing from Cuba any commodities irrespective of
the strategic importance of the goods, the degree of independence exer-
cised by the affiliate of the American corporation, the sourcing or
' Pub. L. No. 484, 106 Stat. 2315. For a summary of the U.S. regulatory regime see M. P.
MALLOY. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE (1990).
31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1989).
5 The parameters are summarized infra Part IV(A).
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transformation of the product in the third country, and the foreign pol-
icy of the third country. Canadian policy and legislation supports and
promotes trade with Cuba.
This has had significant repercussions in Canada. The Canadian
government has historically and continues to support Canadian trading
activities with Cuba. In direct response to the Cuba Act, the Canadian
government on the recommendation of the Attorney General of Canada
and the Secretary of State for External Affairs issued the Foreign Ex-
traterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992 (United States
Order) on October 9, 1992.6 The United States Order blocks in Ca-
nada the extra-territorial application of the Cuba Act which prohibits,
under United States law, trade with Cuba originating in Canada by
any firm that is U.S.-owned or controlled.
The enactment of these two pieces of legislation in two different
jurisdictions has placed the American officers and directors and man-
agement of .U.S. corporations whose Canadian subsidiaries trade with
Cuba and the Canadian subsidiary's officers, directors and manage-
ment in a difficult position with respect to conducting trade with Cuba
particularly where an established trading relationship exists and new
initiatives are underway or likely to arise.
III. THE FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES ACT
The enactment of the FEMA was in reaction to often expressed
frustration with the extra-territorial application of U.S. export control
laws. The FEMA is similar to blocking legislation enacted in other
jurisdictions.7
The thrust of FEMA is two-fold: it permits the Canadian govern-
ment to limit the production and disclosure of documents and to block
the extra-territorial application of foreign legislation or trading direc-
tives in circumstances where Canadian trading interests are adversely
affected or Canadian sovereignty is infringed; and, it enables the Cana-
dian government to restrict the application of foreign antitrust law.
A. Restriction of Production of Documents
FEMA provides that where, in the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral, a foreign tribunal' has exercised, is exercising or is proposing or is
likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers of a kind or in a manner that
has adversely affected or is likely to adversely affect significant Cana-
dian interests in relation to international trade or commerce involving a
6 SOR/92-584 (1992), 126-22 C. Gaz. Part II.
e.g., in the United Kingdom, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 16 (Eng.)
and similar legislation in Australia.
I This includes any court, body, authority or person having authority to take or receive
information.
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business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or that otherwise has
infringed or is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty, the Attorney
General may by order prohibit or restrict the production or disclosure
of records' to a foreign tribunal where such documentation is in the
possession or in the control of a Canadian citizen or person resident in
Canada. 10 The Attorney General's powers extend to prohibiting or re-
stricting the giving of information by Canadian citizens or residents of
Canada before or for the purposes of a foreign tribunal in relation to
the contents or identification of records in the possession or control of a
Canadian citizen or person resident in Canada. The Attorney General
thus has the power to "block" the application of subpoenas or other
orders to produce evidence by foreign tribunals.
Subject to the existence of an order to restrict production or dis-
closure of documents, an order may be made by a superior Canadian
court to issue a warrant to seize such records and to deliver them to the
court or a person designated for safekeeping. 1 The latter is only per-
mitted where the Attorney General makes application to the court and
the court is satisfied that the provisions of the order may not be com-
plied with if the documents are not seized. This then permits the Cana-
dian government to block or limit the foreign tribunal's capacity to ob-
tain records to support the action before that tribunal.
B. Blocking Orders
The Attorney General of Canada (only with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State for External Affairs) may make an order in cir-
cumstances where a foreign state or foreign tribunal has taken or is
proposing or is likely to take measures affecting international trade or
commerce of a kind or in a manner that has adversely affected or is
likely to adversely affect significant Canadian interests in relation to
international trade or commerce involving business carried on in whole
or in part in Canada or that otherwise has infringed or is likely to
infringe on Canadian sovereignty.12 That the concurrence of the Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs is required is reflective of the fact
that such orders may have significant foreign policy and trade ramifica-
tions. It is pursuant to this provision of FEMA that the United States
Order was made. 13 Prior to the enactment of the United States Order,
Canada and a number of the United States' major trading partners
9 The definition of "records" is extensive and includes any correspondence, memorandum,
book, plan, map, drawing, film, microform, sound recording, videotape, machine readable record.
10 R.C.S., ch. F-29, § 3(l) (1900) (Can.).
11 Id. at § 4.
12 Id. at § 5.
13 A similar order was issued on October 15, 1992 (and made effective October 14, 1992) in
the United Kingdom: The Protection of Trading Interests (US Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions) Order 1992. The substance of the United States Order is discussed infra Part IV(A).
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lobbied against the adoption of the Cuba Act. Once diplomatic over-
tures failed, Canada took action pursuant to this provision of FEMA.
The Attorney General is authorized to issue an order which can
prohibit any person in Canada from complying with such measures or
with any "directives, instructions, intonations of policy or other com-
munications" relating to such measures from a person who is in a posi-
tion to direct or influence the policies of the person in Canada. The
application of the Order is not restricted to citizens or persons resident
in Canada but extends to anyone who is physically present in Canada,
irrespective of nationality. The Attorney General may require a person
receiving such directives, instructions, intonations of policy or other
communications to notify him of such communications.14 Measures
taken or to be taken by a foreign state or foreign tribunal include
"laws, judgments and rulings" made or to be made by the foreign state
or foreign tribunal and directives, instructions, intonations of policy and
other communications issued by or to be issued by the foreign state or
foreign tribunal.
C. Penalties
A contravention of an order made pursuant to Sections 3 or 5 (de-
scribed above) renders the person liable to conviction of an indictable
offense and/or to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 5 years or both or to conviction of an offense pun-
ishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not exceeding
$5,000 and/or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or
both.16 It is a precondition to prosecution under this provision that the
order must have been served on the person against whom an action has
been brought. FEMA provides for personal service on individuals or
service on the manager, secretary or other executive officer in the case
of corporations. 6 Where a "class" of persons is involved (i.e., Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S.-owned or controlled corporations), a superior Court
may authorize service in such a manner as it deems appropriate. In the
case of the United States Order, service was effected by means of sub-
stituted service through advertisements in Canadian newspapers. No
proceedings may be made with respect to an offense under FEMA
without the consent of Attorney General.
IV. THE UNITED STATES BLOCKING ORDER
On October 9, 1992, in direct response to the anticipated promul-
gation of the Cuba Act, the United States Order was issued. The
1, FEMA, R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§ S(1)(a)-(b) (1990) (Can.).
15 Id. at § 7.
16 Id.
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United States Order blocks in Canada the extra-territorial application
of the Cuba Act. In 1990, the Canadian Government issued a similar
order, but that order did not become operative because President Bush
vetoed the relevant U.S. legislation. 17 When it became apparent that
President Bush would not veto the Cuba Act, the Canadian Govern-
ment for the first time issued a blocking order under FEMA that has
come into effect.
A. Background and Previously Existing Regime
The United States has historically restricted the trading activities
of U.S. nationals with Cuba. In response to pressure from its trading
partners, in 1974, the United States amended the Cuban Asset Control
Regulations to establish a licensing mechanism to permit certain trans-
actions between U.S.-owned or controlled firms in third countries and
Cuba where local law or local policy favored trade with Cuba.18 While
the text of this legislation has varied over the past 17 years, Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S.-owned or controlled firms traded with Cuba either
through the licensing mechanism or as a result of Canadian diplomatic
intervention. United States trade with Cuba has historically been a sen-
sitive issue and from time to time the pressure to prohibit even indirect
trade by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-owned or controlled firms has been
intense, as was the case in 1990 and most recently in 1992. The deci-
sion by President Bush to approve legislation substantially the same as
legislation he vetoed in 1990 is the result of election pressures and the
power of Cuban-American voters who support a ban on trade with
Cuba.
It is relevant to summarize the U.S. licensing mechanism which
previously, existed to understand the impact of the Cuba Act in Ca-
nada. The Cuban Regulations already limited exports by Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S.-controlled or owned firms, but as in essence the
scope was limited to U.S. origin goods, U.S. financing and strategic
goods, they were not perceived to be extra-territorial in nature and did
not offend Canadian sovereignty to the same degree as the Cuba Act.
The licensing mechanism "permitted" Canadian subsidiaries of Ameri-
can nationals to export products produced in Canada provided that
such products were non-strategic, that no U.S. origin technical data
(other than maintenance, repair and operations data) would be trans-
' Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, SOR/90-751, (1990), C. Gaz.
Part II, p. 4918 (issued Oct. 30, 1990 in anticipation of the Export Administration Act Amend-
ments § 128, approved Oct. 27, 1990). The United States Order revokes the 1990 United States
Order.
8 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1974). This intended to be only a summary of the U.S. position in this
regard for the purpose of the following discussion. For a more in depth presentation, see John
Ellicott, Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Export Control Area, 20
CAN.-U.S. LJ. 133-144 (1994).
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ferred, and that if U.S. origin parts and components were included in
the commodity, the inclusion thereof had been authorized by the De-
partment of Commerce. A similar provision applied with respect to
spares to be re-exported to Cuba in connection with a transaction for
which a "license" had been granted. In addition, there was a require-
ment that no U.S. dollar accounts be involved, no financing or other
credit be provided by the subsidiary and that payment be made on nor-
mal trade terms. American legislation precluded active participation by
U.S. nationals in the trading activity of the Canadian subsidiary. Any
assistance or participation by the U.S. parent firm or an officer or em-
ployee thereof in the negotiation or performance of the transaction
which was the subject of an application for license was not acceptable
and constituted grounds for denial of the license application or the rev-
ocation of an existing license. The legislation required the affiliate to be
independent in the conduct of the Cuban trade related transactions in
matters including, but not limited to, decision making, risk taking, ne-
gotiation, financing or the arranging of financing and the performance
of the contract. While still an "infringement" of Canadian sovereignty,
the impact of the pre-existing regime on American controlled Canadian
businesses trading with Cuba was limited. In essence it imposed an ad-
ditional administrative burden on such companies, but recognized Ca-
nadian sovereignty.
B. The Canadian Context
In contrast to the United States, subject to limited exceptions, Ca-
nada has maintained a strong trading relationship with Cuba'9 and has
consistently resisted efforts by third parties to restrain commercial ini-
tiatives of Canadian firms in Cuba or with Cubans. The Department of
External Affairs has taken the position that Canada will continue to
maintain normal trade relations with Cuba. Of Cuba's hard currency
trading partners, Canada is the largest importer of Cuban products and
the fourth largest exporter.2" Significant Canadian exports to Cuba in-
clude agri-food products (i.e., wheat, maize, fish, fowl), industrial prod-
ucts (i.e., air conditioning equipment and parts), paper products and
telecommunications equipment.2'
The Cuba Regulations "permitted" Canadian subsidiaries of
American nationals to export goods manufactured wholly in Canada or
processed goods originating outside of the United States. The United
States Order and the provisions of the FEMA pursuant to which the
10 For a summary of Canada's trade practice with Cuba see A.L.C. DE MESTRAL AND T.
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION:
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, at 161-70 (1990).
20 Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs.
21 Id.
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United States' Order was made are reflective of the concept of Cana-
dian control or independence. The threshold for the application of this
provision of the FEMA is whether the measures affect international
trade or commerce in a manner that adversely affects "significant Ca-
nadian interests ... involving business carried on in whole or in part in
Canada.22 Canadian interests in Canada must be adversely affected.
Canada thus cannot be used to circumvent the otherwise legitimate ex-
port controls of other countries. It will not sanction or act as the con-
duit for the illegal re-export of foreign produced goods which cannot be
exported from the country of origin. However, where goods are pro-
duced domestically or reprocessed or transformed in Canada, the Ca-
nadian government (subject to its international commitments, such as
COCOM23 ) will not permit third country trading policy to dictate
whether such goods can be exported; foreign ownership of the Cana-
dian manufacturer or processor is insufficient reason for such trading
policy to apply as it is Canada's view that these are Canadian goods.
In the context of Canadian-Cuba trade, as a matter of practice,
any export from Canada destined for Cuba requires the Canadian ex-
porter to certify that no U.S. origin goods are being exported to
Cuba.24 United States origin goods may only be re-exported from Ca-
nada with an export permit.2 5 If the product to be re-exported was of
U.S. origin good, the practice of Customs and Excise, Canada was to
require the Canadian exporter to provide evidence of the United States
export permit. If no export licence had been issued, then generally
speaking, the re-export from Canada would not be permitted as this
represented in effect a re-export of U.S. goods without further process-
ing or transformation.
C. The Order
The Canadian Government issued the United States Order on the
basis that the Cuba Act has and will have a significant adverse affect
on Canadian businesses in relation to international trade and commerce
carried on in whole or in part in Canada and on the basis that the
Cuba Act constitutes an infringement of Canadian sovereignty. The
Canadian government estimated that this extra-territorial application
of United States law could adversely affect approximately Cdn. $30
22 FEMA, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1990) (Can.).
23 Canada participated with its NATO partners (except Iceland) along with Australia and
Japan in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Controls [hereinafter COCOM].
COCOM members establish international lists of strategic goods and technologies, the export of
which are controlled to COCOM proscribed destinations. For a further discussion of COCOM
and its demise see infra Part VII(F).
24 This statement is found on the B13 export form used by Customs and Excise, Canada. See
also the Export Permit Regulations, § 8.
2 Export Act, R.S.C., § 7 (1985) (Can.).
[Vol. 20:145 1994
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million of Canadian trade with Cuba annually as well as restrict poten-
tial opportunities for trade growth between Canada and Cuba.26
The United States Order requires that every corporation registered
or incorporated under Canadian law that carries on business in whole
or in part in Canada and every officer of such corporation "who re-
ceives, in respect of any trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba,
any directives, instructions, intimations of policy or other communica-
tions relating to an extra-territorial measure of the United States from
a person who is in a position to direct or influence the policies of the
corporation" must notify the Attorney General of Canada. An extra-
territorial measure is specifically defined as the Cuba Act and thus the
United States Order's application is limited in scope.
The net effect for Canadian corporations that are owned or con-
trolled by U.S. nationals is to require such corporations to ignore the
fact that licenses will no longer be issued under the Cuba Regulations
and to continue to trade with Cuba as if a license had been issued.
Customs and Excise (Canada) will no longer demand evidence of U.S.
export licenses, but will continue to ensure that only the products man-
ufactured or produced in Canada or, if of U.S. origin, products trans-
formed or reprocessed in Canada will be exported. The requirement to
certify that no U.S. origin goods are included will remain the same.
Canadian corporations are required to report to the Canadian
Government the receipt of any instructions from the United States
aimed at regulating trading activities with Cuba, and a failure to do so
renders the corporation and its officers and directors liable to prosecu-
tion. The United States Order is limited to corporations, their officers
and directors. It does not extend to partnerships or natural persons.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN SUBSIDIARIES AND CONFLICT OF
SOVEREIGNTY
U.S.-owned or controlled Canadian corporations which have deal-
ings with Cuba find themselves in an unenviable position when the con-
flicting legislation is considered. It is clear that in Canada, to the ex-
tent the Canadian subsidiaries' trading activities with Cuba were
permitted before the enactment of the Cuba Act, Canadian law re-
quires such subsidiaries to continue to operate as if the Cuba Act does
not exist. However, when the Canadian subsidiary continues with its
Cuban trading activities, the U.S. parent company and its directors and
officers are likely to be in breach of the Cuba Act and are thereby
exposed to prosecution. If the Canadian subsidiary receives instructions
from its American parent to cease its trading activities or voluntarily
ceases its trading activities because of the obvious repercussions in the
United States, such action is likely to result in a breach by the Cana-
20 Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs.
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dian company, its directors and officers of Canadian law. In addition to
imposition of penalties and possible imprisonment, prosecution of the
American parent corporation in the United States may result in the
corporation being "black-listed" by the U.S. government. This means
that U.S. government procurement contracts that may have been previ-
ously available are no longer likely to be available. Depending on the
number of contracts with the American Government, this may be a
more serious penalty than the actual fine.
While a large number of incidents involving a conflict between Ca-
nadian and American trade policy with respect to Cuba have in the
past been resolved through diplomatic intervention, it is unclear
whether this will be possible under the new regulatory regime as both
countries appear to be intent on enforcing their respective laws. Prior to
the enactment of the Cuba Act, Canada and a number of Western na-
tions were unsuccessful in lobbying American authorities to avoid the
application of the Cuba Act. Thus, it is unlikely that American nation-
als in breach of the Cuba Act as a result of the action of their Cana-
dian subsidiaries will receive a sympathetic hearing.
The confrontation of American law and Canadian law is particu-
larly problematic for individuals who serve as directors of both the Ca-
nadian corporation and the American corporation. The position of the
Canadian government is clear and that is that it expects that Canadian
subsidiaries of American nationals that have traditionally engaged in
trading activities or are engaged in trading activities or are considering
trading activities with Cuba to continue to do so. As soon as a Cana-
dian director crosses the Canadian-American border to attend a direc-
tors' meeting or to attend to other legitimate business in the United
States, he is subject to the potential arrest by American authorities for
a failure to comply with American law. Similar considerations apply to
Americans who are directors of the U.S. parent corporation and direc-
tors of the Canadian subsidiary. To the extent that prosecutions occur
in the United States, the Canadian Government may, under FEMA,
restrict the production of documents situated in Canada which would
assist in the American prosecution.
Is the answer that American directors of Canadian subsidiaries
must resign to avoid possible prosecution in the United States? And
vice versa for Canadians that serve on the boards of the American par-
ent corporation? This is merely a cosmetic solution as it does not ad-
dress the reality of the business relationship. The American parent may
not be prepared to cede control of all operations to Canadian manage-
ment. While there is no need in some cases to have parental controls, in
other situations it is inevitable and sometimes desirable.
Situations where established trading relationship exists or negotia-
tions suddenly break off are likely to be the subject of investigation by
the Canadian Department of Justice and indeed some have been the
[Vol. 20:145 1994
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subject of investigation. Canadian management must carefully consider
any decision to change established business or trading relationships
with Cuba and should ensure that the commodities traded with Cuba
are of "Canadian" and not American origin.
Any U.S. controlled Canadian corporation engaged in trading with
Cuba will have to review carefully the ramifications of complying ei-
ther with American law or Canadian law. It does not appear to be
possible to do both. Multinationals considering trading with Cuba
should analyze their international trading activities and form of busi-
ness organization prior to commencing trading with Cuba. If possible,
multinationals should structure their multinational trading in such a
manner as to avoid the interposition of an American parent and to
avoid indirect or direct American control of entities which are trading
with Cuba. In some instances steps should be taken to reorganize ex-
isting intercorporate holdings. This will at least limit the problem to
situations where Americans are the ultimate owners and not merely a
conduit in a chain of intercorporate holdings.
VI. EXPORT CONTROLS
While the primary area of conflict between Canada and the
United states at the present time relates to trade with Cuba, it is useful
to briefly summarize Canada's export control regime.
Canada's exports (and imports) are controlled through the Export
Act and related legislation which includes a trade sanctions regime and
until recently included the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) regime. While the latter used to
play a significant role in the regulation of Canadian exports, due to the
disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and other trade liberalizing measures,
the COCOM regime has been replaced by a system of national con-
trols. The primary focus thus in the text that follows is on the export
control regime.
VII. THE EXPORT CONTROL REGIME
Canadian exporters and businesses seeking to undertake expansion
must weave their way through a relatively outmoded system of export
controls whose origins, both nationally and internationally, date back to
World War II and the Cold War. This continues to occur, despite sub-
stantial changes in the international economic and political environ-
ment over the last decade and an increase in the importance of the
export market for Canadian companies. Reflective of the growing im-
217 This paper will not address import controls. Canada does have substantial legislation
which deals with import controls which is regulated through the Export Act and related
regulations.
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portance of export markets for the Canadian economy, International
Monetary Fund data recently released, illustrates that, although Ca-
nada's economy accounts for 2% of global production, it accounts for
3.1 % of world trade in goods and services."'
The regulatory framework over export of goods pivots around two
interrelated pieces of legislation. The first is the Export Act 29 and the
regulations thereunder, and the trade sanctions regime. Of greatest im-
portance is the regime established by the Export Act and the Export
and Control List which now embodies what remains of the COCOM
regime.
A. Export Controls, Generally
Canada's domestic regime for export controls has always been as-
sociated with national economic and strategic interests.30 The current
regime finds its origins in the years following World War II, when Ca-
nada and the other Western countries initiated measures to prevent the
transfer of goods and technology to the former Soviet Union and its
allies in the Eastern Bloc. Although these restrictions have been re-
laxed in recent years, the legislative mechanisms established then re-
main the tools with which Canadian exporters must function in the
global economy today.
The basic premise of the Export Act and its regulations is to cre-
ate a two-fold series of controls for domestic exports. The first level of
export control addresses the types of products that can be exported the
second seeks to control the destination to which goods are shipped irre-
spective of the type of product. Export controls are administered by the
Export and Import Controls Division of the Department of External
Affairs (Canada).
B. Export Control List
This first limitation is expressed generally in section 3 of the Ex-
port Act.3 Section 3 permits Canada to limit exports on the basis of
the national security and to maintain domestic supply. It also creates
the Export Control List. This list is an item by item description of the
types of products on which an export controls are imposed.
28 David Crane, How Canada's Economy Fits in a Global Picture, THE TORONTO STAR,
April 24, 1994, at D1, citing IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (1994).
'9 Export Act, R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985) (Can.).
30 For a more detailed discussion see J.G. CASTEL ET AL., THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1991) [hereinafter CASTEL ET AL.].
31 Export Act, R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985) (Can.). "3. The Governor in Council may establish
a list of goods, to be called the Export Control List, including therein any article the export of
which the Governor in Council deems it necessary to control for any of the following
purposes. .. ."
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Control is exercised through the issuance of export permits. All
products on the Export Control List require an export permit before
export. The Export Control List is arranged according to a system of
groupings. The first three groupings run parallel with the classifications
of products and technology under what was the COCOM regime.
These categories are: Group 1: Industrial List;3 2 Group 2: Munitions
List,33 and Group 3: Atomic Energy List.3 4 Further Groups include
Group 4: Nuclear Non-Proliferation List, which includes atomic energy
material, and dual applications equipment and technology; Group 5:
Miscellaneous Goods List, which encompasses diverse products ranging
from endangered wild fauna and flora, medical products, automatic
weapons and U.S. origin products; Group 6: Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime List and Group 7: Chemical and Biological Weapon Non-
Proliferation List; and Chemicals for the Production of Illicit Drugs
List.
In addition, Canada exercises controls separately over the export
of automatic firearms by limiting such exports to countries with which
Canada has intergovernmental deference, research, development and
production arrangements.
C. Area Control List
The second mechanism for controlling the export of products and
technology is the Area Control List. The focus is on the destination of
the export.35 If the destination of the exported good is one of the coun-
tries on the Area Control List, then that product cannot be exported
from Canada without a permit pursuant to section 13 of the Export
Act. Essentially, this mechanism assumes that the destination of the
good is per se a reason for the restriction of its export, regardless of the
nature of the good and its potential applications under any
circumstance.
The Area Control List until recently has been dominated by coun-
tries from the former Eastern Bloc during the majority of its existence.
Since 1989, the number of countries on the list has been reduced sub-
stantially, with only seven countries listed as restricted destinations to-
day. These countries are all states which in the very recent past (or
even present) have had political and/or military conflict with Canada:
(a) Libya, listed since 1986 due to its participation in international
32 This consists of goods and technologies which have both civilian and military application.
3 This consists of munitions, military, naval or air stores.
3' This consists of atomic energy materials and equipment. These first lists have now been
substantially modified as a result of the phase-out of the COCOM regime.
11 Section 4 of the Export Act provides: "4. The Governor in Council may establish a list of
countries, to be called an Area Control List, including therein any country to which the Governor
in Council deem it necessary to control the export of any goods." Export and Import Permits Act,
R.S.Q., ch. E-19, § 4 (1985) (Can.).
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terrorist activities;
(b) Yugoslavia, listed in 1991 because of U.N. sanctions;
(c) Haiti, listed in 1991 because of the overthrow of the civilian gov-
ernment by the military;
6
(d) Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, listed in 1992 because of the
on-going civil war in that area; and, finally,
(e) Angola, listed in 1994 because of United Nations sanctions. 37
Until recently South Africa was on the Area Control list because
of the South African government's support of apartheid.38
D. Export Permits
The export control regime is administered in part through the issu-
ance of export permits. There are two types of export permits: General
Export Permits, which apply to goods that are on the Export Control
List or Area Control List but are not considered by the Canadian Gov-
ernment to be of such sensitivity as to require extensive review, and
Individual Export Permits. An example of a General Export Permit is
General Export Permit No. 25, which applies to goods destined for
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina is on the Area
Control List, a General Export Permit allows specific types of humani-
tarian goods to be exported: food, medical supplies and clothing.
Goods perceived to have substantive strategic value receive closer
scrutiny before export. For such goods Individual Export Permits must
be applied for on a case-by-case basis. Each additional export of the
goods requires a new application, the granting of which remains en-
tirely discretionary. Exporters should anticipate that the issuance of an
individual export permit will take a minimum of 4 to 6 weeks and de-
pending on the product or the destination it may take months.
" These measures were implemented pursuant to the Special Economic Measures Act, S.C.,
ch. 17, (1992) (Can.). Various regulations have been adopted by the Canadian Government relat-
ing to sanctions on Haiti. These include the Special Economic Measures (Haiti) Regulations,
1993, the Special Economic Measures (Haiti) Permit Authorization Order, 1993 as well as the
Special Economic Measures (Haiti) Regulations, the Special Economic Measures (Haiti) Ships
Regulations, the Special Economic Measures (Haiti) Permit Authorization Order and the Special
Economic Measures (Haiti) Permit Authorization Order (ships). As recently as June of 1994
Canada reiterated its support of economic sanctions as reflected in the Special Economic Mea-
sures (Haiti) Regulations, 1993, Amendment of August of 1994. In light of the recent agreement
concluded by President Clinton's emissary with the Haitian Militia, it is anticipated that economic
sanctions will be lifted against Haiti.
37 With respect to Angola, see Order-in-Council PC-1994-366.
11 PC 1994-217 of July 19, 1994, SOR/94-513 removes South Africa from the Area Control
List as a result of the election of the first multi-racial government in South Africa. In addition, a
general Export Permit will no longer be required in connection with the export of goods to South
Africa.
[Vol. 20:145 1994
14
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 20 [1994], Iss. , Art. 18
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol20/iss/18
Lussenburg-EXPORT CONTROLS
E. The COCOM Regime Replaced
The COCOM, founded in 1949, consists of all NATO members
except Iceland, Japan and Australia. Canada has been a member since
1950. The original purpose of COCOM is to control exports of strate-
gic goods and technologies to the former Eastern Bloc countries, as well
as other Communist countries like China and North Korea.
The COCOM regime has been replaced by other international
agreements restricting nuclear proliferation and weapons use and by
national controls as a result of the redefined strategic relationships in
the wake of the demise of the former Eastern Bloc. Consequently,
COCOM's response was to lower the degree of control on certain prod-
ucts, like computer technology, while at the same time revising the list
of Proscribed Destinations in order to take into account new perceived
threats to the strategic interests of member countries. In November
1993, COCOM members determined that the considerations which had
necessitated the establishment of the COCOM arrangement were no
longer present and as a result, the COCOM arrangement was termi-
nated on March 31, 1994. Although it had been anticipated that new
rules would be released in Canada in April of 1994, these were not
released until August of 1994. The changes were effected by way of
amendment to the Export Control List.3 9 What has been agreed is that
the former members of COCOM will exercise national controls over
goods that were previously on the Export Control List. In effect, those
items listed as Groups 1, 2 and 3 on the COCOM list will no longer be
subject to control (but will be governed by other international agree-
ments). Those items under the Group 4, Nuclear Non-Proliferation,
Group 6, Missile Systems and Group 7, Chemical Weapon Precursors,
Biological Agents and Related Equipment will continue to be con-
trolled. In addition, Group 8 of the COCOM list which includes chemi-
cals used in the production of illicit drugs will be now controlled under
the guidelines established by the Chemical Action Task Force as well
as subject to regulation under Group 5, Miscellaneous Goods.
F. Trade Sanctions
Trade sanctions can be imposed by Canada on an ad hoc basis
through three mechanisms. The first mechanism is the enactment of
federal legislation specifically for that purpose. This does not occur fre-
quently because of the time required to draft and pass such legislation.
Sanctions can also be imposed under the United Nations Act.40 This
Act provides the Canadian Federal government with the necessary au-
thority to implement United Nations resolutions in Canada. This has
3 P.C. 1994 - 1296, 3 August, 1994, SOR/94 - 530.
,0 United Nations Act, R.S.C., ch. U-2, (1985) (Can.) (hereinafter the United Nations Act).
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rarely been used. Examples of implementation of economic and trade
sanctions pursuant to the United Nations Act include the sanctions en-
acted with respect to Iraq in 1990.41 The Iraq regulations prohibit the
export from Canada knowingly of any goods to any person in Iraq,
either directly or indirectly.
The third legislative basis, pursuant to which the federal govern-
ment may enact trade or economic sanctions which can effect interna-
tional distribution, is the Special Economic Measures Act.42 This Act
authorizes the federal government to impose sanctions when there has
been a "grave breach of international peace and security" or when Ca-
nada must fulfill its international commitments. The sanctions imposed
against Haiti were enacted under this legislation.
The significance of international sanctions is that business enter-
prises should be aware of Canada's international political commitments
and, to the extent that Canada has taken a position of opposing exports
to specific jurisdictions, then manufacturers, distributors and exporters
should be sensitive to this and carefully review their existing distribu-
tion practices. Until the recent relaxation of controls on the export and
import of goods from and to South Africa, it was good example of such
sanctions. Sometimes products imported from the United States, for
example, may be subject to one level of export control in the United
States and another (not necessarily similar) level of export control in
Canada. The re-export of the finished product is complicated thereby.
G. U.S. Origin Goods
U.S. origin goods are the subject of separate and special treatment
under Canada's export control regime. Pursuant to the Export Act and
the Export Control List the trans-shipment or reshipment of U.S. ori-
gin goods through Canada can be problematic because the U.S. main-
tains restrictions on the destination of its exports as part of its trade
policy regulation. Under Item 5400 of the Export Control List, the ex-
port of U.S. origin goods to third countries requires an export permit.
Usually, it is sufficient to specify on the export form that the goods are
not of U.S. origin. The mere fact that a particular good is of U.S.
origin does not mean that the good cannot be exported. There is a Gen-
eral Export Permit in existence which allows the re-export of U.S. ori-
gin goods4" to all but the countries on the Area Control List and cer-
tain proscribed destinations. These include destinations such as
Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. The reference to Cuba should, how-
ever, be qualified by the Canadian government's position discussed
41 United National Iraq Regulations. S.O.R./90-531, as amended.
42 Special Economic Measures Act, supra note 36; See for example the numerous regulations
enacted pursuant to this statute with respect to Haiti listed in supra note 36.
" General Export Permit No. 12.
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above as reflected in the United States Order.44
VIII. ANTIBOYCOTT LAWS
Antiboycott legislation is usually extra-territorial in its application
and seeks to regulate commercial transactions beyond domestic bor-
ders. It is thus relevant to briefly touch upon certain restrictive U.S.
legislation and Canadian antiboycott legislation which may impact on
Canadian business arrangements. The Canadian position with respect
to antiboycott laws is that it can give rise to conflict or concern in inter-
national transactions where, for example, the primary contractor is a
United States company and a significant portion of the U.S. company's
contractual commitments are subcontracted to a Canadian company.
In this context, it is not unusual to find that the U.S. company will seek
to impose upon Canadian companies an obligation to adhere to U.S.
antiboycott rules which may not be wholly consistent with the Cana-
dian position. United States' antiboycott laws seek to prevent United
States companies or their subsidiaries from acceding to international
boycotts against states, companies or persons.45
A. The United States
There are two statutes in the United States which create an-
tiboycott measures.46 The first is the Export Administration Act,47
which comprises a complex and detailed set of rules which prohibit the
participation in boycotts, and also govern a company's ability to enter
into and provide information that assists in the promotion of interna-
tional boycott legislation. This legislation is administered by the U.S.
Commerce Department. The second is the Internal Revenue Code48
which is administered by the U.S. Treasury Department.
The reach of this legislation is broad, and is extra-territorial in its
application. Under the Export Administration Act, the scope of the leg-
islation covers "U.S. persons," which is defined to include foreign sub-
sidiaries of U.S. companies that are "controlled in fact" and are acting
in "U.S. commerce. ' 49 The relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code apply to U.S. taxpayers and their "controlled groups," a term
that includes "majority-owned or controlled subsidiaries and sister
4 See supra Part IV.
41 For a review of this issue for example, see H.E. Moore & W.M. McGlone, International
Contracts: Avoiding Problems Under U.S. Antiboycott Law, Export Controls, and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, in NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, at 53 (S.P. Battram and D. N. Goldsweig, eds., 1991).
" This is not intended to be an exhaustive review, U.S. authorities should be consulted on
this issue.
47 Section 8 of the Export Administration Act, 15 C.F.R. § 769 (1985).
41 I.R.C. § 999, also referred to as the "Rubicoff Amendment."
'9 Moore & McGlone, supra note 45, at 54; 15 C.F.R. § 769.1(b).
17
Lussenburg: The Collision of Canadian and U.S. Sovereignty in the Area of Exp
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1994
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
companies the majority of which are owned by the same five or fewer
persons.",5 0
U.S. antiboycott legislation prohibits a U.S. company or its subsid-
iary from providing information that is requested under international
boycott legislation, including information regarding a company's busi-
ness dealings with the state of Israel, as well as information regarding
the ownership of a company's shares, or its directors or officers. Many
of this legislation potentially conflicts with Canadian law.
U.S. antiboycott legislation generally does not apply to unrelated
foreign agents or unrelated intermediaries since these are not "U.S.
persons." The issue of whether a business enterprise may become a
company "controlled in fact" or party of a "controlled group" will de-
pend on the particularities of the relationship.
B. Canada
In Canada, boycott clauses are subject at the federal level to the
1978 Canadian Government Policy 51 on international economic boy-
cotts and at the provincial level (Ontario), to the Discriminatory Busi-
ness Practices Act (Ontario) (the Ontario Act).52 In Canada, the issue
of antiboycott clauses arises most frequently in the context of trade
with certain Middle Eastern countries that prohibit trade with Israel.
C. Federal
o Permitted Boycott Undertakings
In Canada, boycott undertakings may be "classified" as primary,
secondary and tertiary.
Primary boycott undertakings are permitted and do not constitute
offensive behavior under the Canadian Policy. An example of a pri-
mary boycott undertaking would be the refusal of a Saudi contracting
party to accept any goods or components of the boycotted country (i.e.
Israel), either directly or indirectly. In this context, a Canadian busi-
ness enterprise shipping goods to Saudi Arabia may comply with ship-
ping document requirements that require certification with respect to
country of origin, the name of the carrier and the route of shipment.
Such information must be supplied in positive, non-exclusionary terms
except for specific details with respect to the name of a carrier, ship-
ment route etc. A negative statement or certification - i.e. that the
goods are not of Israeli origin is not acceptable. These are referred to
as "negative statements of origin." Sometimes when the Canadian bus-
iness is a subcontractor, this Canadian restriction can be problematic.
50 Moore & McGlone, supra note 45, at 54. I.R.C. § 993(a)(3).
51 This is reproduced and discussed in Castel et al. supra note 30, at pages 423-430.
52 R.S.O., ch. D.12 (1990) (Ontario).
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* Prohibited Boycott Undertakings
Secondary, tertiary and umbrella boycott undertakings are gener-
ally speaking not permitted, unless a specific clause limiting such un-
dertakings is included.
A secondary boycott is a boycott which in general terms would
require a business, as a pre-condition of doing business in a country, i.e.
Saudi Arabia to limit its commercial activities with respect to another
country, i.e. Israel. This offends Canadian policy because it involves a
relationship and transaction separate and distinct from the transaction
in question and is deemed to interfere with the business enterprise's
commercial freedom.
A tertiary boycott undertaking is one that requires a contracting
party to certify that goods or services are not procured in whole or in
part from a particular jurisdiction - usually Israeli enterprises. It is the
Canadian Government's position that such undertakings could limit the
ability of the business enterprise to do business with other Canadian
businesses and consequently, such behavior is unacceptable.
Umbrella and general boycott undertakings which require Canadi-
ans to abide by the laws and regulations of the country in which they
wish to do business (i.e. Saudi Arabia) or to general rules of boycott,
may be unacceptable. In order to receive support from the Canadian
government, companies wishing to provide such a general undertaking
must include in the contract or supporting documentation a provision
along the following lines:
. . . that in meeting the terms of this contract, the [sellers] are not
required to discriminate against any person on the basis of race, reli-
gion or national or ethnic origin, and are not required to refuse to
purchase from or sell goods and/or services to any other Canadian
company agency or individual, sell Canadian goods and/or services to
any country, or purchase goods and/or services from any country, ex-
cept that it would be the right of the purchaser to refuse to accept
goods, components and/or services of specified non-Canadian origin
that would be prohibited entry if imported directly...
A failure to abide by the Federal Policy will result in a denial of
government support and assistance with respect to the transaction. In
addition, the name of contravening enterprises are published in semi-
annual reports tabled in Parliament. A failure to report such activity is
subject to a maximum monetary penalty of $500 and three months in
jail. Under the Corporations and Labour Unions Return Act,5" the
sanction is a daily fine of $50 for each day of late reporting.
83 R.S.C., ch. C-43 (1985) (Can.).
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D. Ontario (Provincial)
The Ontario Act is less restrictive than the Federal Policy. Its pur-
pose is to prevent discrimination in Ontario on various grounds includ-
ing geographical location of persons engaging in business.
The Ontario Act prohibits engaging in discriminatory business
practices. Discriminatory business practices include a provision in a
contract which would require a business enterprise to agree to refuse to
do business with persons, businesses, etc. . ., from Israel. In addition, a
provision in the contract which would require the business enterprise to
agree to refuse to engage in business with Israelis or with persons that
engage in business with Israelis or products and services of Israeli
origin.
The Ontario Act, like the Federal Policy, prohibits "negative
statements of origin." The Ontario Act also prohibits seeking (or agree-
ing to seek) any information for the purpose of engaging in a discrimi-
natory practice.
The Ontario Act imposes a positive obligation on recipients of re-
quests (oral or written) to engage in a discriminatory business practice
to disclose such requests to the Director under the Ministry of Con-
sumer and Commercial Relations Act (Ontario). Enforcement provi-
sions include orders to cease the discriminatory business practice and
undertakings. A person who incurs loss or damage as a result of a dis-
criminatory business practice has the right to compensation for the loss
or damage and to punitive or exemplary damages from the person who
committed the contravention. In addition, any person against whom an
order (to cease a discriminatory business practice) is made or who is
convicted under the Ontario Act, is ineligible to enter into a contract to
provide goods or services to the Government of Ontario and its related
agencies for a period of five years from the date of the Order or of the
conviction.
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